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Abstract 
In the early 1990s, the Dutch social partners agreed upon transforming the generous and actuarially unfair 
PAYG early retirement schemes into less generous and actuarially fair capital funded schemes. The 
starting dates of the transitional arrangements varied by industry sector. In this study, we exploit the 
variation in starting dates to estimate the causal impact of the policy reform on early retirement behaviour. 
We use a large administrative dataset, the Dutch Income Panel 1989−2000, to estimate hazard rate models 
for early retirement. We conclude that the policy reform induced workers to postpone early retirement. In 
particular, both the price effect (reducing implicit taxes) and the wealth effect (reducing early retirement 
wealth) are shown to have a positive impact on the early retirement age. Yet, we show that model 
specifications including the most commonly used financial incentive measures are open to further 
improvements, given that these are outperformed by a simple specification with dummy variables. 
 
Key words: early retirement, intertemporal choice, duration analysis 
 
JEL code: C41, D91, J26 
                                                 
1
 The authors thank Arthur van Soest, Marcel Kerkhofs, Bernd Fitzenberger, Peter Kooiman, Arie Kapteyn, Gerard van den Berg, Martijn van de Ven, 
Jaap Abbring, and participants of the ESPE 2005, IZA Summer School 2005, 6th RTN Conference on the Economics of Ageing in Europe, ESWC 2005, 
EEA 2005, ESSLE 2005, and seminars in Amsterdam and The Hague for valuable comments and discussions. The provision of data by Statistics 
Netherlands is acknowledged. 
2
 Affiliations: CPB; IZA; CEPR. 
3
 Affiliations: CPB; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Department of Econometrics).  
4
 Affiliations: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Department of Economics); Tinbergen Institute. Corresponding author. E-mail: wolthoff@tinbergen.nl 
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
The Dutch labour force participation rate of elderly is low compared to other western countries. In 1990 
the employment-to-population ratio for age 55 to 64 was 29.7 percent (OECD, 2005). Partly due to the 
favourable economic circumstances at the end of the 1990s this rate increased to 46.6 percent in 2004, but 
still remained below the OECD average. Although population ageing is less dramatic for the Netherlands 
than for many other countries, and although the capital funding of the occupational pensions makes the 
Dutch economy less vulnerable to ageing altogether, the low participation rate before the mandatory 
retirement age of 65 is an important policy issue. As a broad base of tax payers is necessary to bear the 
financial consequences of population ageing, increasing the labour force participation of the elderly has 
become an important policy issue in the Netherlands – as it is in many other countries.  
 
In the early 1990s, the Dutch social partners (unions and employer organisations) recognised the adverse 
incentive effects of the prevailing early retirement schemes. They decided to transform the generous and 
actuarially unfair pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes into less generous and actuarially fair capital funded 
schemes. The starting dates of the transitional arrangements varied by industry sector. In this study, we 
exploit this variation in starting dates to estimate the causal impact of the reform on early retirement 
behaviour. Starting April 1, 1997, the participants of the pension fund for civil servants (ABP) were the 
first to face new early retirement conditions. By using employees of a selection of other industry sectors as 
a control group we are able to estimate to which extent financial incentives affect the (early) retirement 
decision.  
 
The transitional arrangements to the new actuarially fair schemes cause major changes in the individual 
early retirement rights. First of all, employees can retire at a much younger age under the new schemes. 
The actuarial adjustments in the new schemes however introduce a ‘price effect’: a retiring employee will 
pay the ‘fair’ price for leisure, while under the old scheme its price was virtually zero. Or stated 
differently, in case an employee postpones early retirement he gets rewarded with a ‘fair’ wage instead of 
being subject to a high implicit tax rate. Secondly, the new schemes entail lower ‘early retirement wealth’, 
i.e. less financial resources for the purchase of leisure. This ‘income effect’ or ‘wealth effect’ potentially 
leads to a postponement of early retirement. 
 
Many studies on the labour force participation of elderly have demonstrated that financial incentives are 
important for individual retirement behaviour. Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) conclude this on the basis of 
country studies using a discounted measure for future social security and pension incomes. Within this 
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project, Börsch-Supan et al. (2004) reach the conclusion using the German Socio-Economic Panel, 
Blundell et al. (2004) using the UK Retirement Survey, and De Vos and Kapteyn (2004) using the Dutch 
Socio-Economic Panel. Using an alternative data source, the Dutch Retirement Survey (CERRA), 
Kerkhofs et al. (1999) conclude that financial incentives are important for early retirement and to a lesser 
extent for alternative early retirement routes like unemployment and disability insurance. However, on the 
basis of the same data, Heyma (2001) concludes that the importance of financial incentives is limited for 
the different early retirement routes. In an overview article that is mostly based on US evidence, 
Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) conclude that the impact of financial incentives on early retirement is 
important, but that not more than half of the observed variation in retirement patterns in the US can be 
explained from these financial incentives.  
 
In this study we are able to estimate the causal impact of the early retirement reform by exploiting the 
variation in starting dates of the transitional arrangements. It is important to note that although the reform 
could be foreseen, it could not be evaded by the individual worker so that so-called anticipation effects do 
not hamper our analysis. Every age-cohort faced a pre-determined transitional arrangement in which no 
individual worker had the possibility to retire with the old scheme before the new scheme became relevant 
for this worker. The dataset we use for the empirical part of our study, the Dutch Income Panel 
1989−2000, is based on administrative records of the Dutch National Tax Office. Estimating hazard rate 
models for early retirement we find that the policy reform induced workers to postpone early retirement.  
 
In section 2 we address theoretical issues with respect to the retirement decisions of individuals. Early 
retirement schemes in the Netherlands are reviewed in section 3. Section 4 discusses the data, while 
section 5 presents the estimation results. In section 6 we investigate the goodness of fit of different model 
specifications. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theory 
 
2.1 Modelling the retirement decision 
 
The ‘standard’ textbook model assumes that individuals maximise their expected lifetime utility subject to 
a lifetime budget constraint. Consumption (C) and leisure (L) are the choice variables in this problem, the 
latter including the time spent in retirement. The individual’s optimal retirement date is implicit in the 
leisure time path, and is thus an outcome of the optimisation process. Denote the utility function by U, the 
level of assets by A, the individual discount rate by ρ, wage by w (when full-time employed), and the 
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interest rate by r. Introducing dynamics through time subscripts for age t, a basic version of the inter-
temporal model is 
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Here W is the value function, and Et takes the expectation at time t. Taking expectations at the right hand 
side of (2.1a) allows for randomness in the model, e.g. stochastic future wages. The most important 
derivations from this dynamic programming model (DP model) are the Euler equations which determine 
the optimal time paths for both consumption and leisure. Explicit solutions for the time paths do not exist 
unless some restrictive assumptions are made about the functional form of the utility function. A common 
– often realistic – assumption is that L can take on only two values, corresponding with either retirement 
(L = 1) or continued work (L = 0), and that retirement is irreversible. As a consequence of this assumption, 
the retirement age contains sufficient information to reconstruct the optimal leisure time path Lt,...,LT. 
Denote the retirement age by R, maximum age by T, and the discount factor for age s by βst := (1+ρ)-(s-t). 
Then (2.1) implies that immediate retirement is optimal iff 
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i.e. the expected lifetime utility given immediate retirement is higher than the expected lifetime utility 
given at least one extra period of continued work. 
 
Several authors have estimated a parameterisation of (2.2), including generalised versions for households, 
and taking into account health, and liquidity constraints (e.g., Van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2003; Blau, 
2004; French, 2005; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005). However, this approach is computationally very 
demanding, and therefore simplifying assumptions are often made. Rust (1989), Rust and Phelan (1997) 
and Heyma (2004) assume that households cannot borrow or save. This last assumption is equivalent to 
assuming that consumption at any time t equals income Yt at time t. Hence, an important simplification of 
(2.2) is to write it in terms of some indirect utility function V rather than the direct utility function U, so 
that the decision to retire at age t follows 
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(2.3) 
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where V(·|R) denotes indirect utility conditional on retirement at age R. This specification is easier to use 
in practice as individual income is more easily observed than consumption and savings decisions. 
 
In the option value model (Stock and Wise, 1990a; 1990b) rather than maximising expected lifetime 
utility (or indirect utility) an agent chooses the retirement date for which the expected utility is at its 
maximum, i.e. immediate retirement is optimal iff 
(2.4) 
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In comparison with (2.3) the max and expectation-operators are interchanged. Equivalence between the 
two equations is only achieved if t=T, i.e. there is only one period to make a choice for. As Stock and 
Wise note, the expected value of the maximum of a set of random variables is larger than the maximum of 
their expected values, and thus the option value of continued work is necessarily smaller than would be 
implied by the DP rule in (2.2). An alternative version of (2.4) is 
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where G(t) is the option value of continued work, i.e. a negative value corresponds to immediate 
retirement being the optimal decision of the individual. In words, the option value gives the difference 
between the utility from delayed optimal retirement and immediate retirement. Denote by Bs(R) the 
amount of cash flow to or from the pension fund at age s given retirement age R. A common specification 
for the expected indirect utility function is  
(2.6) 




≥
<
=
RsRkB
RswRYVE
sst
sst
sst
 if)]([
 if][)|( γ
γ
σ
σ
 
where σst is the conditional survival probability (of reaching age s conditional on having reached age t), γ 
is the risk aversion parameter and k represents the relative valuation of leisure.  
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In their econometric specification Stock and Wise (1990a; 1990b) allow for individual specific random 
effects in both wage and retirement income. However, only very few authors have succeeded in estimating 
the full-fledged option value model as originally specified by Stock and Wise. Instead, most applications 
based on (2.5) use the variable G(t) in a reduced form context. The most common application is to fix the 
parameters γ, k, and ρ at some given values, and let G(t) enter as a linear regressor in a probit model (e.g., 
Samwick, 1998; Börsch-Supan, 2000; Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2003; Asch et al., 2005).5 This is 
equivalent to estimating the full option value model with fixed parameters, and deterministic wages and 
retirement income (Lumsdaine et al., 1992). Several authors have questioned whether going from the full 
DP model to the OV model in (2.5) should be regarded as a simplification, as the latter might as well be a 
more ‘realistic’ alternative to describe the individual’s retirement behaviour. Lumsdaine et al. (1992) 
conclude that the DP model and the OV model perform equally well in explaining and predicting the 
retirement behaviour of individuals. In a different context (viz. the application for SSDI benefits in the 
United States), Burkhauser et al. (2003) even conclude that the OV model outperforms the DP model.  
 
Coile and Gruber (2000) note that a potential drawback of the option value measure is that it is a function 
of future wages, and the latter may be a major source of variation across individuals. This implies that the 
researcher who is interested in identifying the behavioural effects induced by the early retirement scheme 
may find that the OV is for a large part measuring the effects of income dispersion rather than the effects 
he is interested in. Furthermore, this approach does not allow for estimating the separate effects of 
different (complementary) pension schemes. As an alternative the authors propose making use of the 
‘peak value’, which is defined as 
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In words, the peak value is the difference between total discounted pension wealth at its maximum 
expected value and its value if retirement occurs immediately. As discussed in Samwick (2001), the peak 
value is the same as the option value under the assumptions that future wages do not affect the optimal 
retirement age, workers are not risk averse (γ=1), and income in retirement has the same utility value as 
income before retirement (k=1). The peak value is usually not applied in a decision rule such as (2.2) to 
(2.5). More often the peak value (with fixed discount rate) is used as an explanatory variable in a reduced 
                                                 
5
 The values at which the parameters are fixed in the mentioned references are between 0.75 and 1.00 for γ (risk aversion up to risk neutrality); 
between 0.03 and 0.05 for ρ (discount rate between 3 and 5%); and between 1.5 and 3.1 for k. Note that none of these ranges is in accordance with the 
‘original’ estimates (γ=0.63; ρ=0.22; k=1.25) of the full option value model obtained by Stock and Wise (1990a). 
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form probit model, just like the option value (with fixed parameters), see e.g., Coile and Gruber (2000), 
Asch et al. (2005). 
 
2.2 Early retirement schemes 
 
From the viewpoint of the individual, early retirement schemes can be characterised by only a few 
parameters. In the first place, individuals fulfilling certain eligibility conditions qualify for a certain 
amount of ‘pension wealth’ P at a given age t0. The eligibility conditions usually include an employment 
constraint, and often work history requirements. The latter is obviously a natural condition in the case of 
capital funded schemes. Secondly, retirement at a higher age than t0 alters pension wealth by pt at time t   
(t ≥ t0). We define pt here as the net increment in pension wealth as a result of an additional year of work 
at age t. Values for pt may both be positive or negative, and are often close to zero in case of an actuarially 
fair early retirement scheme.6  
 
Both ‘pension wealth’ P and the net increment in pension wealth pt may be important for early retirement 
behaviour. The importance of these variables does not obviously follow from the models of the previous 
subsection. The DP model of equation (2.2) does not lead to explicit expressions for the ‘wealth’ and 
‘price’ effects induced by P and pt, respectively. The effects are more easy to understand within the option 
value model of equation (2.5) and the peak value model of equation (2.7). We will illustrate this with two 
simple hypothetical early retirement schemes: one flat-rate early retirement scheme, and one actuarially 
fair scheme. For ease of exposition, we only focus on early retirement benefits in this section. In the 
empirical analysis (see section 5) the old-age pension benefits will also be taken into account.  
  
We consider the individual’s behaviour in the extreme case of a flat-rate early retirement scheme with 
eligibility age tA. That is, the replacement rate – pension income as a fraction of labour income7 – does not 
depend on retirement age, and always equals rA. Assume that the wage profile {wt} is unaffected by 
characteristics of the early retirement scheme and the individual’s timing of retirement. In this scheme, 
pension wealth at eligibility age tA simply equals benefits times the number of time periods until old-age 
pension times a discount factor. Denoting by tP the age at which the old-age pension starts, and by           
βst := (1+ρ)-(s-t) the individual’s discount factor for age s, we thus have 
                                                 
6
 Even for an actuarially fair early retirement scheme, pt may however deviate from zero if the individual’s discount rate is not equal to the discount rate 
employed by the pension fund. This discussion will be pursued at the end of this section. 
7
 Several definitions for ‘labour income’ are used in practice; e.g. the ‘final pay’ system uses the last observed labour income, while ‘average pay’ uses 
the lifetime average labour income. In the following we will assume a final pay scheme, but results can be easily generalised to an average pay scheme 
or combinations of both types of schemes. 
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where some composite discount factor β is used on the right-hand side. Furthermore, it is easily checked 
that retirement after the eligibility age results in a loss in pension wealth. To be precise, for t ≥ tA we have 
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where again some composite individual discount factor β~ is used. Hence for a nearly constant wage rate, 
i.e. wt ≈ wt-1, we have 
(2.10) tAt wrp −≈  
This last equation clearly shows that in a flat-rate scheme the implicit tax on continued work simply 
equals a year’s early retirement benefits. In the more general case of non-constant wages in (2.9) an extra 
term is added representing potential gains (losses) stemming from the fact that early retirement benefits 
are based on the last observed wage rate. That is, individuals with an increasing wage profile experience a 
lower disincentive to continue working than individuals with a constant wage rate.  
 
The option value measure G(t) of equation (2.5) discounts the losses due to the future implicit taxes on 
continued work and takes into account potential future changes in wages. The peak value measure H(t) in 
equation (2.7) does not take the potential future changes in wages into account and can be directly 
computed from (2.9) or (2.10), 
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p  Clearly, for the current case of a flat-rate early retirement scheme the 
optimal timing of retirement τ* equals the current time t, for which H(t)=0.  
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Next, assume that the pension fund adjusts replacement rates according to some discount factor δ, so that 
from its own viewpoint the scheme is actuarially fair and pension wealth P remains constant over time. 
Denoting by rt the replacement rate given that the (early) retirement age is t, and defining ηst := (1+δ)-(s-t), 
we have 
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which after some rearrangement gives 
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There is some empirical evidence suggesting that an important share of individuals do have a discount rate 
which is significantly higher than that used by pension funds (Samwick, 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier, 
2005). For this reason, even in the case of actuarial fairness from the viewpoint of the pension fund, 
pension wealth P may not be constant over all retirement ages, and the net increment in retirement wealth 
pt may not be equal to zero. Hence, we write the net increment as 
(2.14) 
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Finally, substituting (2.13) in (2.14) and rearranging gives 
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Hence, if the individual discount factor precisely equals the discount factor used by the pension fund 
(ρ=δ), then pt=0 for all t≥t0, which is equivalent to stating that the pension scheme is actuarially neutral. In 
this case, the peak value equals zero, H(t) = 0, but the option value measure G(t) still depends on future 
wages. The latter is precisely in line with the earlier mentioned criticism of Coile and Gruber (2000). 
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However, if the individual discount rate exceeds the discount rate of the pension fund, then generally 
tt ηβ ~~ < , so that pt<0 and H(t)≤0, i.e. the peak value indicates that working longer leads to a loss in 
pension wealth. 
 
3. Early retirement schemes in the Netherlands 
 
The Dutch pension system consists of both old-age pension provisions and early retirement schemes. The 
statutory old-age pension age is 65. From that age on all Dutch inhabitants are entitled to a state pension. 
In addition most employees are entitled to a supplementary occupational pension.8 Before age 65 early 
retirement schemes apply.   
 
Early retirement schemes have started since the mid-seventies of the past century. The first schemes, the 
so-called ‘VUT schemes’,9 operated as PAYG systems in which the working population pays for the 
retirement of early retirees. The schemes were favourable for older workers, and the eligibility conditions 
were rather mild. In the 1990s concerns grew about the adverse incentive effects and the long run financial 
sustainability of the prevailing VUT schemes. A general agreement was reached between the social 
partners (trade unions and employer organisations) and the government to reform the system. The PAYG-
based VUT schemes were gradually replaced by capital funded ‘pre-pension’ (PP) schemes. These new 
early retirement schemes introduce actuarial adjustments across different retirement ages. Moreover, the 
early retirement wealth is lower in the new schemes. 
 
In the Netherlands, early retirement rules are negotiated between unions and employer organisations at the 
sectoral level of industry. Together with the other terms of employment, the early retirement rules are laid 
down in collective labour agreements. The administration of the early retirement schemes is the 
responsibility of pension funds, special ‘early retirement funds’, or insurance companies, whereby large 
sectors of industry as well as a number of large enterprises have their own pension fund. In most cases 
early retirement benefits are conditionally indexed, that is, ER benefits are indexed with respect to both 
the inflation rate and the development of contractual wages, conditional on the pension fund’s financial 
status.10 While computing a financial incentive measure in later sections we will assume full indexation of 
ER benefits, which is a realistic assumption for the period under consideration (1989−2000). 
 
                                                 
8
 See Bovenberg and Meijdam (1999) for details on the Dutch old-age pension system. 
9
 In Dutch, the acronym ‘VUT’ stands for ‘early retirement’. 
10
 The same applies to occupational old-age pensions. 
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3.1 Flat-rate early retirement schemes 
 
From the late 1970s on, early retirement schemes were agreed upon in many collective agreements and 
consequently installed in many sectors of industry. A typical feature of these schemes was its flat rate, i.e. 
the replacement rate does not depend on retirement age. The eligibility age was decreased several times in 
most sectors and at the end of the eighties it was age 60 or 61 for the majority of the employees. The 
schemes were a shared responsibility of the social partners, and were facilitated by the government 
through a favourable tax treatment: pension premiums were deductible from the worker’s gross salary, 
while early retirement benefits were being taxed as if they were a regular source of income. Due to the 
progressive tax system the tax advantage was considerable (Kooiman et al., 2004).  
 
The financial conditions of these early retirement schemes were favourable for older workers: gross 
benefits equalled up to 80% of the last earned gross wage, and old-age pension entitlements continued to 
grow as if retirees kept on working. To qualify for early retirement through this scheme, a worker needed 
to reach the eligibility age and needed to be working in a sector or firm for at least 10 years. As these 
schemes did not contain any actuarial adjustments, this clearly gave a great incentive to retire at exactly 
the eligibility age. This is well documented in, e.g., Lindeboom (1998) and Kapteyn and de Vos (1999). 
 
3.2 Actuarially adjusted early retirement schemes 
 
From the mid 1990s on, the flat-rate early retirement schemes are being replaced by actuarially adjusted 
‘Pre-pension’ (PP) schemes. The capital funded PP schemes are collective (mandatory) savings 
arrangements in which workers make savings for their own early retirement. A major difference between 
the flat-rate and PP schemes is the funding which changed from PAYG to capital funding. From the point 
of view of the individual worker, the funding is however hardly relevant (except that he may be concerned 
about the long-run financial sustainability of the early retirement scheme), as he is mainly interested in the 
financial consequences of the choices he is able to make.  
 
Under a PP scheme, an employee is eligible to receiving the maximum benefit only if he has contributed 
to a PP scheme for 35 or 40 years, depending on the exact regulations of the early retirement scheme. If 
the employee has a shorter employment history, then the early retirement benefits will be lower pro rata. 
A further difference between both schemes is that the early retirement wealth is considerably lower in the 
new scheme. In a sample of 105 collective labour agreements, the Labour Inspectorate (2004) finds that in 
most collective labour agreements the gross replacement rate at a given retirement age was decreased by 
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at least 10%-points. Second, the old age pension rights no longer continued to increase during early 
retirement, as was the case under the flat-rate schemes. 
 
An important ‘price effect’ is caused by the introduction of actuarial adjustments into the PP schemes. 
Compared to an old flat-rate scheme, where the price of leisure was nearly zero (compare eq. (2.10)), this 
implies that the price of leisure has risen substantially. Most PP schemes are actuarially fair and allow 
taking up early retirement benefits from the age of 55 on. Thus, compared to the eligibility age in the flat-
rate schemes, actuarial adjustments are made both to higher and lower retirement ages. This aspect may 
induce employees to retire either before or after this former eligibility age. 
 
3.3 Transitional arrangements 
 
Transitional arrangements were introduced in order to smooth the transition from flat-rate schemes to 
actuarially adjusted schemes. These transitional arrangements were partly financed by PAYG and partly 
by capital funding. In practice, this meant that most older workers continued to face early retirement 
arrangements that were close to the old schemes. An exception was the pension fund of civil servants 
(ABP), which started reforming their early retirement schemes relatively early, and introduced some 
actuarial adjustments into their schemes from 1997 on. Civil servants who retired after April 1, 1997 and 
who were born before April 1, 1942 faced a replacement rate of 59% at age 60, while those who were 
born later receive 55%. This contrasts conditions from before April 1992, when 80% was received at this 
age (or, for civil servants of local governments this replacement rate was even received at age 59). 
 
Table 3.1 shows the replacement rates in early retirement schemes in eight included industry sectors for 
the period 1989–2000. In four sectors, the early retirement replacement rates have not changed during this 
period. For some sectors the transition officially started during the period, but the transitional arrangement 
guaranteed the same replacement rate as in the old flat-rate scheme. None of the included sectors has a 
transitional arrangement which is completely actuarially fair, so that postponement of retirement until the 
age of 65 was still discouraged. Note that the national government and education sectors share the same 
early retirement schemes, and that both these sectors together with the local government have their early 
retirement schemes administered by the pension fund ABP. This pension fund has actuarially fair 
schemes, but only until the age of 61.11 
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 This changed in 2003 (not shown in the table). In that year ABP finished the transition by introducing a scheme that was actuarially fair and provided 
a replacement rate of 70% at age 62. 
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Workers build up a complete old-age pension by contributing 35 or 40 years to a pension fund. Under the 
flat-rate schemes, early retirees continued to build up old-age pension rights. Under the PP schemes this is 
no longer the case, implying that most early retirees are not able to build up a complete old-age pension. 
Table 3.2 reports old-age pension replacement rates for a worker that would receive a complete old-age 
pension in case he works until age 65. The old-age pension replacement rates are relevant for constructing 
the financial incentive measures discussed in section 2. Note that the low replacement rates for the 
catering and cleaning industries do not necessarily imply lower pension benefits, as the franchise equals 
zero (see note e in table 3.2). 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1 The IPO dataset 
 
The data for this study are drawn from the Dutch Income Panel (Inkomens Panel Onderzoek, IPO) 
1989−2000, which is a one percent sample of income histories of registered citizens of the Netherlands 
with at least one registration during the 12-year period. Our selected subsample consists of observations 
on 2937 individuals who are employed at their 55th birthday in one of eight selected sectors of industry, 
and not living on welfare, unemployment insurance or disability insurance at this initial age. We observe 
these individuals from their 55th birthday on. 
 
The IPO dataset is drawn from registers made available by the Dutch National Tax Office and is 
administered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). In total, the dataset contains about 75 thousand individuals 
per year. The dataset contains individuals that are included in the Dutch municipal registers. Attrition 
occurs only because of migration or death, or because of permanently moving to an institution (like a 
nursing home or a prison). New individuals are added to the sample every year to compensate for the loss 
in numbers of observations because of attrition.  
 
The IPO dataset is particularly suitable for studying early retirement behaviour. Besides its accuracy, an 
important advantage is the long time period over which we observe individuals. Furthermore, the dataset 
contains industry sector codes (SBI74, SBI93), which allows us to merge the individual data with 
information from collective labour agreements, including information on institutional early retirement 
ages and gross replacement rates. The dataset has some disadvantages as well, as the Dutch official 
registers lack information on education, health and pension wealth. 
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As the information on pension and early retirement arrangements is crucial for our study, we need to 
select sectors of industry that match to one and only one collective agreement on the four-digit level code 
for the industry sector. Each of these sectors has a pension fund which carries out the pension and early 
retirement regulations. The industry sectors and their respective pension funds that we selected for this 
study were shown in table 3.1.12 The resulting dataset contains 2937 individuals, of which 1232 are 
employed in the government sector, 741 in the education sector, 445 in the health care sector, 224 in the 
post/telecom sector and 295 in one of the other sectors. Unfortunately, we cannot use the exact 
classification of tables 3.1 and 3.2 as the industry sector codes do not allow us to differentiate between 
national and local government. In the empirical analysis (see section 5) we will therefore assume that a 
civil servant works at the national government with a given probability. 
 
Our sample of individuals who are employed at age 55 contains mainly men, only 22% of the sample is 
female (table 4.1). The low share of women is in line with the low employment rate of Dutch women in 
this cohort; later cohorts of women have substantially higher employment rates. The health care pension 
fund (PGGM) has by far the largest proportion of women. Only few individuals are single at age 55, while 
the individuals have on average 0.17 children under the age of 18.  
 
As can be read from the table, the individuals in our sample have relatively high incomes and are 
relatively wealthy. This is in line with the prevailing system of seniority wages and the principles of the 
life cycle model (see section 2), respectively. About 71% earns more than the Dutch median income. In 
particular, employees in the government, education and post/telecom sectors have relatively high incomes. 
Despite the relatively small number of employees in the health care sector with a high income, the housing 
value and mortgage debt is relatively high. This may be due to the rather heterogeneous group of 
participants with nursing personnel on the one hand and medical personnel on the other hand.  
 
4.2 Sample size and measurement 
 
For a proper measurement of the effect of the reform it is important to have sufficient numbers of 
observations under the different early retirement schemes. Of the 1232 observations in the government 
sector, 356 observations fall under the old scheme and 312 observations fall under the new scheme (table 
4.2). The other 564 observations fall under both schemes as at age 55 they are not eligible to any early 
retirement benefit, while on April 1, 1997 they suddenly become eligible for a benefit without having 
reached the earlier eligibility age of 61. A comparable categorisation of the observations holds for the 741 
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 The selected pension funds cover about 40% of all employees in the Netherlands aged between 25 and 65. 
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observations in the education sector. Of the 445 observations in the health care sector, 298 observations 
became eligible for a benefit according to the transitional scheme on January 1, 1999. Note, however, that 
this scheme is highly actuarially unfair (table 3.1). 
 
As the regulations of the different early retirement schemes change at different points in time during our 
observational period, a descriptive analysis on the basis of aggregated data is not straightforward. The 
major change in the regulations is however on April 1, 1997, so that we may be able to see some change in 
early retirement behaviour for the civil servants after that date. In fact, we use the participants of the 
pension funds other than ABP as a control group. It should be noted that the two most important pension 
funds in our control group concern workers in the health sector and the post and telecom sector, which are 
presumably the sectors which can best be compared with workers who are subject to the ‘treatment 
pension fund’ ABP.13 However, we will make a special effort in the next section to take account of both 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity of workers in different sectors. 
 
The conditional early retirement probability, or hazard rate, of the participants of the pension funds other 
than ABP is slightly lower after April 1, 1997 for all ages except for the age of 61 (right panel of figure 
4.1). The favourable economic conditions at the end of the 1990s may have caused a slight change in early 
retirement behaviour. The hazard rate for the education sector (ABP) hardly changes after April 1, 1997. 
We may conclude that the transitional arrangement hardly induced workers to retire before the age of 61 
(left panel of figure 4.1), although the new system explicitly allows for this. We may also conclude that 
workers of the education sector hardly postponed early retirement, which is unsurprising as the transition 
scheme is not actuarially fair after age 61 (table 3.1). The hazard rate for government workers (ABP) did 
change. Under the old flat-rate scheme some employees retired at the ages of 59 and 60, and these 
employees are likely to have been working for the local government (see table 3.1). After April 1, 1997, 
very few participants retired before the age of 61. This may be an indication of the policy reform being 
effective. 
 
5. Empirical strategy and results 
 
The purpose of this section is to estimate the impact of the policy reform on early retirement behaviour. 
Our identification and estimation strategy is based on the variation in the starting dates of the transitional 
arrangements. We use a mixed proportional hazard rate model to explain the duration of employment after 
age 55. We use one specification with dummy variables to estimate the average impact of the reform, and 
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 The government owned a majority of shares in the (then combined) post and telecom company until 1995. 
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we use two specifications with measures of the financial incentives to estimate the price and wealth effects 
more precisely (section 2). In the next section, we will use goodness-of-fit measures to check the accuracy 
of the different model specifications. 
 
We are able to estimate the causal impact of the reform by exploiting the variation in starting dates of the 
transitional arrangements. We compare the early retirement behaviour of civil servants before and after the 
reform, and we use workers for which the reform did not take place yet as a control group. We use a 
control group, because early retirement behaviour may have changed because of the favourable economic 
conditions during the late 1990s. It is important to note that the reform could not be evaded by the 
individual worker so that so-called anticipation effects do not hamper our analysis: every age-cohort faced 
pre-determined transitional arrangement and alternative early retirement options hardly existed. 14 
Nevertheless, for our identification and estimation strategy we need to assume the impact of the macro-
economic conditions on early retirement behaviour to be the same for all sectors of industry included in 
the analysis. However, as was seen in the previous section, our selection of sectors of industry into the 
control group makes this assumption more plausible. 
 
5.1 Mixed proportional hazard rate model 
 
We use a mixed proportional hazard rate model to describe the time working since the age of 55. The 
advantage of a hazard rate model over probit regressions per age from 55 to 64 (which are often used in 
the literature) is that hazard rate models account for the endogenous selection of those still working at 
older ages. A probit regression at, e.g., age 63 gives the probability of early retirement at this age 
conditional on working at the birthday of age 63. This model is suitable for policy simulations with 
changing incentives at this particular age. The model is however not suitable for policy simulations with 
changing incentives over the whole range from age 55 to 64 as the model does not account for the 
endogenous change of the population that still works at the birthday of age 63. Hazard rate models are 
designed to take this selection into account. A second point is that probit regressions per age allow for a 
different impact of the financial incentives at different ages. In our hazard rate model, we restrict the 
impact of a given financial incentive to be the same over different early retirement ages.  
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 It is possible that alternative exit routes – such as Disability Insurance – become relatively more attractive as a consequence of the reform. The 
impact of the reform on these exit options is however beyond the scope of this paper. Another alternative exit route that may become important in the 
future is part-time work combined with partial early retirement. Partial early retirement was however hardly possible during our period of investigation. 
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We model the duration Ti of an individual i as the time that elapses between his 55th birthday and the 
moment of (early) retirement. Although the data allow us to measure Ti in days, we round this duration to 
years for two reasons. First, data are to a large extent clustered around (especially right after) birthdays so 
that measuring Ti in days would not add much variation. Second, closer inspection of the data reveals that 
measurement in days may be not very precise, as the tax authorities are not so much interested in daily 
information but rather in information on a yearly basis. Since retirement is mandatory at the age of 65, this 
implies that Ti will not exceed the value of ten. Retirement is supposed to be an absorbing state: an 
individual who is retired will not start working again.15 The hazard rate (or instantaneous exit rate) 
( )iiti xt ελ ,|  for individual i at time t is defined as the marginal probability of immediate retirement, 
conditional on not having retired yet before time t. Define a vector of time-dependent individual 
characteristics xit, a conformable parameter vector β, and an unobserved individual heterogeneity term εi 
and let 
(5.1) ( ) ( ) ( ).'exp, 0 iitiiti xtxt εβλελ +=  
In this equation λ0(t) is the baseline hazard, and εi is a random term representing unobserved heterogeneity 
between individuals. Following Meyer (1990) we will estimate the baseline hazard semi-parametrically: 
we consider a model with observations on a yearly basis to get parameters for t = 0, ..., 9 with one 
parameter for each age. The probability that a spell lasts until time t+1 given that it has lasted until t now 
reads as: 
(5.2) ( ) ( )[ ],'exp)(exp,,1),,( 0 iitiitiiiit xtxtTtTPxth εβλεε +−=≥+≥=  
where 
(5.3) ( ) .)( 1 00 ∫ += tt duut λλ  
The vector of parameters [ ]9 000 )( == ttλλ  can be estimated along with the other parameters in β. Next, we 
assume that unobserved heterogeneity can be characterised by a mixture of two mass points: 
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 This is however not a heavy constraint in our analysis. First, practice shows that the early retirement event is indeed absorbing in the overwhelming 
majority of cases. Second, even if it would not be absorbing, then we could simply redefine the duration to be equal to the moment of first (early) 
retirement. 
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(5.4) ,)( αηε ==iP  
with the second mass point chosen such that E[exp(εi)]=1, i.e. P(εi=η2)=1-α, with η2=(1-αexp(η))/(1-α).16 
Furthermore, note that on the basis of the information in our dataset we cannot differentiate between 
workers of the national and the local governments. We assume workers of the government to be part of the 
national government with a given probability 0.39. This probability is based on the proportion of civil 
servants which is working for the national government. The likelihood of observing a particular retirement 
date follows from (5.2), after taking the expectation with respect to the unobserved heterogeneity term 
using (5.4). Thus, summing over individual workers indexed by i, the likelihood function reads as: 
(5.5) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,,,,,11,,,,1log
0
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where δi equals one if individual i is observed until the age of (early) retirement, and zero otherwise, and ti 
is the length of the observed (either completed or uncompleted) spell. Maximisation of this likelihood 
function with respect to ),,,( 0 ηαλβθ =  yields consistent and asymptotically efficient parameter 
estimates. 
 
5.2 Specification with dummy variables 
 
Our first specification makes a distinction between actuarially unfair and actuarially fair schemes using 
dummy variables. We estimate the impact of the reform on the basis of these dummy variables for the 
different relevant early retirement schemes. The results should be interpreted as an average effect of the 
reform from a generous actuarially unfair to a less generous actuarially fair scheme, making the 
specification robust for possible misspecification of the financial incentives. However, what exactly drives 
the change in early retirement behaviour remains unclear. For this reason, the next subsection will 
implement a specification with the measures for the financial incentives of section 2. 
 
In general, a worker can fall under three regimes: (1) a worker may be not yet eligible to an early 
retirement benefit. In this case, early retirement is unattractive as the worker will loose all early retirement 
rights. (2) A worker may be eligible to a flat-rate early retirement benefit. As was seen in section 2.2, 
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 As noted by Heckman and Singer (1984), results may be very sensitive to the choice of a particular functional form for the distribution of εi. Therefore, 
the authors proposed using a non-parametric characterisation of εi by means of a finite set of points of support, whose number, locations, and weights 
are empirically determined. Guo and Rodriguez (1994) have found that, in practice, two or three points of support often suffice. 
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early retirement is then attractive as continuing to work hardly leads to a higher life-time income. (3) A 
worker may be eligible to an actuarially fair early retirement scheme.  
 
To allow for the three different regimes in the empirical hazard rate model, we define two dummy 
variables: one dummy variable incentive to retire and one dummy variable incentive to wait (see table 5.1 
for exact definitions). The latter dummy implies that the worker will become eligible at some moment in 
the future if he postpones early retirement, leading to an incentive to wait. Because of the reform, the 
value of the dummies changes over time for the civil servants (participants of the pension fund ABP). The 
dummies for the other industry sectors do not change over time, which makes an interpretation as ‘control 
group’ possible. 
 
The estimation results show that the baseline hazard is upward sloping until age 61 and downward sloping 
after that age (table 5.1). The null hypothesis that the baseline hazard is constant is strongly rejected by a 
likelihood ratio or a Wald test. This hints at the presence of age dependence. On the basis of deteriorating 
health conditions and a possibly increasing preference for leisure with age we could expect a 
monotonically increasing baseline hazard. An explanation for the peak at age 61 may be interdependence 
of preferences, but measurement error may play a role as well as the incentive to retire at exactly that age 
may in reality be stronger than expressed by the dummy variables for the reform. As such explanations 
relate to misspecification, we will address this issue in more depth in section 6. 
 
The early retirement behaviour differs significantly between participants of different industry sectors. 
Even after correction for individual characteristics, the workers of the industry sectors government, 
education, Post, Telecom and Agriculture retire significantly earlier than the workers of the other sectors. 
As could be expected, individuals with children have a lower hazard rate than those without. The dummy 
variable high income has a positive sign, while the variable house value has a significantly negative sign. 
Interpretation of these outcomes may be hampered by omitted variable bias, as these variables may be 
correlated with for example education. Neither the other individual characteristics nor the year dummies 
have a significant effect on the hazard rate. On the other hand, unobserved heterogeneity turns out to be 
important. 
 
The estimate of the dummy variable incentive to retire is significantly positive. Thus, the old flat-rate 
early retirement schemes indeed result in a higher propensity to withdraw from the labour market than an 
actuarially fair scheme. The dummy variable incentive to wait has the theoretically correct sign but is not 
significantly different from zero. Theoretically one would expect that not having reached the eligibility 
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age gives a strong incentive to postpone early retirement. But as we could see from the left panel of figure 
4.1 already, after April 1, 1997 only few workers decided to retire at the ages of 55 to 59 anyhow. These 
results show that the policy reform is effective, i.e. on average it induced workers to postpone early 
retirement. The major cause of this result is that the high implicit tax at the eligibility age was removed. 
 
5.3 Specification with financial variables 
 
Our second specification attempts to capture the impact of financial incentives more precisely by making 
use of measures for the price effect by both the peak value and the option value, respectively, and the 
wealth effect by the pension wealth variable (section 2). An advantage over the previous specification is 
that we can now make use of different sources of variation in financial incentives in order to identify the 
effects separately. Thus, in theory, this specification should give the best results. On the other hand, one 
should keep in mind that the specification is built on assumptions which may not hold true. For this 
reason, the specification may be less robust to misspecification (see section 6). 
 
Table 5.2 presents results with the peak value measure (equation (2.7)), while table 5.3 discusses the 
results for the option value measure (equation (2.5)). For the option value measure we assume the 
marginal utility of income to fall with consumption, to be precise γ = 0.75 (see equation 2.6). The relative 
valuation of leisure parameter (k) is set equal to 1.7, and the individual discount rate (ρ) equals 4%.17 
Furthermore, both model specifications use the variable pension wealth in order to estimate the wealth 
effect resulting from the early retirement schemes.  
 
Both specifications of the model yield a clear wealth effect as the parameter of the variable pension wealth 
is significantly larger than zero. So, a larger pension wealth induces workers to retire at younger age. 
Furthermore, both specifications yield a clear price effect as well. Both parameters for the option value 
and the peak value are significantly negative, which is consistent with theory. A financial reward to 
postpone early retirement, in the form of a higher benefit level in case of postponement, induces workers 
to continue working. Most parameters have changed only little compared to the estimates of the preceding 
section. A remarkable change is however that the baseline hazard now continues to increase after age 61. 
The propensity to retire increases with age, which is in line with, for example, decreasing health with age. 
 
In order to interpret the estimated coefficients we may translate these into marginal effects ξk as follows 
(for variable xk): 
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 We experimented with different parameter values. Within the ranges mentioned in footnote 5 there was not much variation in the results. 
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where ξ denotes the individual’s expected time spent in early retirement (measured in years). Details on 
the exact computation of ξk are provided in the appendix. Measuring xk in 100,000s of euro, we compute 
marginal effects at sample average values for the peak value and option value at 0.67 and 0.62, 
respectively. Thus, increasing the peak value with 100,000 euros18 would induce the average worker to 
extend his career by about 8 months (≈0,67·12). The marginal effect of an increase in pension wealth with 
100,000 euros is estimated at -0.39 and -0.47, respectively, depending on which specification is used. 
Increasing pension wealth with 100,000 euros would induce the average worker to extend his career by 5 
to 6 months. Stated differently, the average worker would extend his working career by one year either if 
he receives about 150,000 euros extra paid out in wages (price effect), or if his pension wealth is 
decreased by about 250,000 euros (wealth effect). Thus, the early retirement decision is more sensitive to 
changes in the price of leisure than to changes in his pension wealth. Again, this is in line with theory, as 
wealth changes may equally affect the demands for other goods than leisure.   
 
6. Goodness of fit 
 
Although the parameter estimates of the previous sections look plausible, it is an open question how well 
the models perform in reproducing the observed early retirement patterns. As the models are not nested, a 
formal likelihood ratio test to compare the models is theoretically incorrect. Therefore we use other, less 
formal measures for the goodness of fit. 
 
According to Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973) and Schwarz’s Information Criterion 
(Schwarz, 1978), the model on the basis of the dummy variables outperforms the two other models. The 
criteria are based on the likelihood, and are often used in practice to compare non-nested models. The 
criteria correct the log-likelihood for the number of observations and the number of parameters. As these 
latter figures are however the same for our three model specifications, the criteria boil down to a simple 
comparison of the log-likelihoods. The model on the basis of the dummy variables clearly performs best, 
while the two other models perform about equally well.   
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 Note that the peak value is measured in terms of net future cash flows, viz. equation (2.7). An additional incentive of 100,000 euros thus equals about 
3 to 4 net year salaries of the average worker (compare table 4.1 which reports average gross salaries). 
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As the different pension funds of the industry sectors offer rather different incentives to retire, it is 
informative to see how the models perform in terms of predictions of the conditional early retirement 
probabilities (hazard rates) at different ages. In particular, some early retirement schemes show strong 
incentives to retire at one particular age, i.e. education (ABP) , Post/telecom (TPG/KPN) at age 61 and the 
health care sector (PGGM) at age 60.19 The non-parametric Kaplan-Meier hazard rates clearly show the 
existence of these incentives: the hazards of education (ABP) and Post/telecom (TPG/KPN) reach a clear 
peak of 56% and 77% at age 61, while the hazard of the health care sector (PGGM) reaches a peak of 59% 
at age 60 (table 6.1).  
 
The models perform reasonably well in the sense that the predicted hazard rates reproduce the age patterns 
of the different industry sectors (table 6.1). Nevertheless, the models have difficulties in reproducing the 
level of the peaks for some sectors. This is particularly true for the health care sector (PGGM). Recall that 
the baseline hazard of the three models shows a peak or a clear jump at age 61, leading to excess 
retirement at that age. As the pension fund of the health care sector (PGGM) gives an incentive to retire at 
age 60, it is rather obvious that the model has difficulties in reproducing an age pattern with a peak at age 
60. In the literature, some models perform better in terms of predicted hazard rates, for example, Gustman 
and Steinmeier (2005). Note, however, that they need to explain only two peaks in the hazard rates for 
workers who all face the same early retirement scheme. We need to explain hazard rates for workers that 
face many more different schemes (table 3.1).  
 
On the basis of simple goodness-of-fit measures for the hit rate per industry sector, we again conclude that 
our model on the basis of dummy variables for the reform is the best performing model. As our interest is 
in predicting the hazard rates per sector, we construct a simple goodness-of-fit measure which can be 
calculated easily per sector:20 
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with weights wt and the observed and predicted conditional early retirement probabilities tp and tpˆ . A 
natural choice for the weights may be the number of observations.  
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 The ABP(gov) includes workers of the national and the local government, who face different early retirement schemes. 
20
 Heckman and Walker (1987) discuss formal tests for the goodness-of-fit, but in practice these are seldom used.  
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According to our simple goodness-of-fit measures, the model on the basis of the dummy variables is the 
best performing model for all industry sectors; see the last two columns in table 6.1. The models on the 
basis of the financial variables seem to do about equally well. The fact that the measures are close to one 
does not necessarily mean that the models are doing very well: the models are able to reproduce the small 
hazard rates at age 55 to 59. Most of the action however takes place at ages 60 and 61. In particular our 
first measure gives little weight to these ages as the numbers of observations are low at these ages. 
Therefore we construct a second measure which does not weigh with the number of observations (last 
column). But according to this measure the first model is the best performing model as well. 
 
Why do our models have difficulties in reproducing the peaks in the hazard rates? In particular, our model 
with dummy variables seems to do rather well, and nevertheless the peak remains a problem. We can think 
of two explanations: measurement error and misspecification. We discuss two special cases of 
misspecification that are often mentioned in the literature: interdependent preferences and irregularities in 
intertemporal optimisation behaviour: 
Measurement error: although our dataset allows us to observe early retirement incentives of individual 
workers in more detail than datasets of previous studies, it does not allow us to observe the exact early 
retirement and pension rights. In particular, for the construction of the financial variables we need to make 
assumptions. Note that for the model with dummy variables, we only need to assume a worker to be 
working in a firm or a sector for the last 10 years. This assumption is less strong than the assumption on 
complete contribution histories we have to make in the models with financial incentive measures. For this 
reason, our first model with dummy variables is likely to be less seriously affected by measurement error. 
Interdependent preferences: our estimation results show excess retirement at age 61 (table 5.1), or a jump 
in the early retirement probability at this age (tables 5.2 and 5.3). This may be the result of interdependent 
preferences. The baseline hazard will pick up interdependent preferences as long as it is the same over all 
industry sectors. As the workers in the health care sector do not show excess retirement at age 61, 
interdependent preferences may however vary by industry sector. Allowing for different baseline hazards 
per industry sector may correct for this kind of misspecification. But it may lead to overfitting of the 
model as well. A better strategy would be to explain interdependent preferences, but this is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Examples of empirical applications in consumption and labour supply are Kapteyn et 
al. (1997) and Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998). 
Irregularities in intertemporal optimisation behaviour: more and more evidence is becoming available 
that people do not behave according to the standard life cycle model with rational expectations and time-
consistent planning behaviour. This may be a serious threat to the option value model, but also to the peak 
value model which discounts future early retirement benefits. The question how non-standard optimisation 
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behaviour affects early retirement behaviour is beyond the scope of this paper as well. Frederick et al. 
(2002) provide a recent overview of issues in time discounting and time preferences. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we estimate the causal impact of an early retirement reform on early retirement behaviour. 
We exploit the variation in starting dates of transitional arrangements from actuarially unfair schemes to 
more actuarially fair schemes. It is important to note hat the reform could not be evaded by the individual 
worker so that so-called anticipation effects do not hamper our analysis: every age-cohort faced pre-
determined transitional arrangement in which no individual worker had the possibility to retire with the 
old scheme before the new scheme became relevant for this worker. The dataset we use for this purpose, 
the Dutch Income Panel 1989−2000, is based on administrative records of the Dutch National Tax Office. 
Estimating hazard rate models for early retirement, we find that the policy reform induces workers to 
postpone early retirement.  
 
The reform of the Dutch early retirement system causes major changes in the individual early retirement 
rights. First, the actuarial adjustments in the new schemes introduce a price effect as the price for leisure 
becomes ‘more fair’. Secondly, the new schemes entail lower early retirement wealth which potentially 
leads to a wealth effect, i.e. less resources to purchase leisure time. By modelling the exact financial 
incentives and using them in our empirical model specification, we try to disentangle the empirical 
relevance of these two effects. According to our estimates, an increase in the ‘peak value’ of 100,000 
euros would make the average worker extend his career by 8 months,21 while a decrease in his early 
retirement wealth by the same amount would induce a career extension of 5 months. Although the 
estimation results look quite reasonable, simulations show that the models with the financial incentives 
have a harder job in predicting the peaks in early retirement at certain ages than the model with robust 
dummy variables for the reform. Measurement error and misspecification due to interdependent 
preferences and irregularities in individual intertemporal optimisation behaviour may play a role here. 
 
As early retirement will remain important on the policy agenda, more research to answer some open 
questions is needed. First of all, better data obtained by merging information on individual early 
retirement and pension rights to the administrative data from the Dutch National Tax Office will largely 
rule out the problems with measurement error. This will help to get a better identification of the price and 
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 The peak value is defined as a worker’s increase in lifetime wealth if he decides to continue working for one year (see section 2). 
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wealth effects in early retirement behaviour. Second, behavioural aspects are likely to be important. 
Therefore, the incorporation of behavioural elements into the empirical analysis of early retirement will be 
a major challenge for the future.   
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Appendix A. Computation of marginal effects 
 
In this appendix we show how the estimated coefficients of the hazard model can be translated into 
marginal effects. The coefficients of the hazard model are gathered in the vector β (see equation (5.1)) and 
may contain financial incentive measures such as the peak value, option value, and pension wealth. 
 
Given some early retirement hazard rate λ(t), it is standard to show that the corresponding probability for 
retirement at time t is given by22 
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It is however possible that workers make use of alternative exit routes, such as Disability Insurance (DI). 
Denote the DI hazard rate at time t by µ(t). Equation (A.1) then generalises to  
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Now, the probability that the individual retires at time t conditional on retirement through the official early 
retirement scheme equals 
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so that the expected period spent in early retirement equals 
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 This is the discrete time analogue of equation (2.4) on p. 9 in Lancaster (1990). 
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Although not shown explicitly in the current notation, λ and f are still conditional on a vector of 
exogenous variables x (compare equation (5.1)). Hence, the change in ξ resulting from a marginal 
change in the variable xk equals 
(A.5) .
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Using equation (A.2), this quantity can be computed for each individual using numerical differentiation. A 
straightforward estimator of ξk is then simply the average of all individual values for ξk. The DI hazard 
rates used in equation (A.2) are obtained from aggregate statistics. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 3.1 Early retirement replacement rates for 8 selected sectors, 1989−2000a  
Date of retirement Date of birth Retirement age 
  55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 
           
National government, education (ABP)           
< April 1, 1992  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
April 1992 – April 1993  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
May 1993 – March 1997  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 75% 75% 75% 75% 
≥ April 1, 1997 < April 1, 1942 27% 30% 35% 40% 48% 59% 75% 75% 75% 75% 
 ≥ April 1, 1942 25% 28% 32% 38% 45% 55% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
            
Local government (ABP)           
< June 1, 1993  0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
June 1993 – Dec. 1994  0% 0% 0% 0% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 
Jan. 1995 – March 1997  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 
≥ April 1, 1997 < April 1, 1942 27% 30% 35% 40% 48% 59% 75% 75% 75% 75% 
 ≥ April, 1 1942 25% 28% 32% 38% 45% 55% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
           
Health care (PGGM)           
< January 1, 1999  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
≥ January 1, 1999 in 1939 - - - - 40% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
 in 1940 - - - 40% 40% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 
 in 1941 - - 0% 39% 39% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 
 in 1942 - 0% 0% 39% 39% 77% 77% 77% 77% 77% 
 in 1943 0% 0% 0% 38% 38% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 
 in 1944 0% 0% 0% 38% 38% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 
            
Post/telecom (TPG/KPN)           
Full period  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
            
Agriculture (BPL)           
Full period b  0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
            
Catering industry (PHC)           
Full period  0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
            
Cleaning industry (BPSG)           
Full period b  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
 
a
 We select industry sectors for which (i) workers can be identified on the basis of their industrial sector code (SBI) in the dataset that we 
will use, and (ii) for which we are able to construct the early retirement replacement rates. Arrangements for workers born after 1945 are 
not reported, as these are irrelevant for our analysis. Replacement rates are constant over time from the moment of early retirement until 
age 65. Names of pension funds are reported between parentheses. Note that only seven early retirement schemes are presented, as 
the national government and education sectors share the same scheme. 
b
 Although not reported in this table, both the Agriculture and Cleaning industries changed their early retirement schemes between 1989 
and 2000. However, these changes did not affect any person in the dataset that we will use, and are therefore omitted. 
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Table 3.2 Old-age pension replacement rates for 8 selected sectors, 1989−2000a 
Date of retirement Franchiseb       Retirement age 
  55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 
          
National government, education (ABP)          
< April 1, 1992 15 250c 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
April 1992 – March 1997 15 250c 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 61% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
≥ April 1, 1997 15 250c 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 61% 63% 65% 67% 68% 70% 
            
Local government (ABP)            
< January 1, 1995 15 250c 53% 54% 56% 58% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
Jan. 1995 – March 1997 15 250c 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
≥ April 1, 1997 15 250c 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 61% 63% 65% 67% 68% 70% 
             
Health care (PGGM)            
Full period 13 580d 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
             
Post/telecom (TPG/KPN)            
Full period 15 881e 53% 54% 56% 58% 60% 61% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
             
Agriculture (BPL)            
Full period 13 739e 53% 54% 56% 58% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
             
Catering industry (PHC)            
Full period 0e 14% 15% 15% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
             
Cleaning industry (BPSG)            
Full period 0e 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 
 
a See note a in table 3.1. 
b The franchise serves as a threshold in the calculation of the supplementary occupational pension benefits. Individuals only build up old-
age pension if their wage exceeds the franchise. In this way pension funds take into account the state pension that individuals receive. 
c In 2004. 
d In 2003. 
e In 2002. A zero franchise together with a replacement rate of 19% implies that an individual receives 19% of his last earned wage 
income plus a state pension. With a nonzero franchise, the individual only receives an ‘additional’ pension benefit if his (past) wage 
income exceeds a certain threshold level. ‘Additional’ here means ‘supplementary to the state pension’. Thus, the first case in general 
leads to higher pension benefits for lower incomes. 
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Table 4.1 Sample statistics of workers in 7 selected industry sectors at age 55, 1989−2000 
 government education health care post/telecom agriculture catering cleaning Total 
         
Observations 1232 741 445 224 172 71 52 2937 
         
Individual characteristics        
Female 0.13 0.26 0.50 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.31 0.22 
Single 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.09 
Children (≤18y) 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.31 0.25 0.31 0.17 
         
Financial characteristics        
Gross wage (×€1000) 42.00 48.37 36.87 34.51 34.90 37.95 28.30 41.50 
High incomea 0.75 0.81 0.54 0.79 0.53 0.58 0.42 0.71 
House valueb 1.65 2.00 2.02 2.05 1.75 1.14 0.89 1.76 
Mortgageb 1.06 1.28 0.94 0.97 0.58 0.68 0.27 1.02 
         
a Dummy which equals 1 if income is higher than the Dutch median income. 
b Relative to yearly income. 
Source: Dutch Income Panel (Statistics Netherlands), 1989−2000, own calculations. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Number of observations per regime, workers in 7 selected industry sectors, 1989−2000 
Industry sector 
 
Start of 
transition 
VUTa 
 
Both 
 
Transitionb 
 
Total 
 
      
Government (ABP) April 1997 356 564 312 1232 
Education (ABP) April 1997 116 412 213 741 
Health care (PGGM)c January 1999 147 298 0 445 
Post/telecom (TPG/KPN) - 224   224 
Agriculture (BPL) - 172   172 
Catering industry (PHC) - 71   71 
Cleaning industry (BPSG) - 52   52 
Total  1138 976 525 2937 
      
a Generous flat-rate early retirement scheme (see section 3.1) 
b Transitional arrangement to less generous and actuarially fair early retirement scheme (see section 3.3) 
c Note that the transitional arrangement of the health care sector is highly actuarially unfair (table 3.1). 
Source: Dutch Income Panel (Statistics Netherlands), 1989−2000, own calculations. 
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Figure 4.1 Conditional early retirement probabilities (hazard rates) before (B) and after (A) April 1, 1997a 
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a Conditional early retirement probabilities according to the Kaplan-Meier method. The conditional early retirement probability is the probability to retire 
at a certain age, conditional on working at the date of turning that age (the birthday). 
Source: Dutch Income Panel (Statistics Netherlands), 1989−2000, own calculations 
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Table 5.1 Estimation results, model specification with dummy variables 
Variable Estimatea  Std. errorb  Variable Estimatea  Std. errorb 
         
Baseline hazard     Industry sectors    
Age 55 − 4.87 * (0.58)  Gov/Edu (ABP) 1.02 * (0.29) 
Age 56 − 4.84 * (0.62)  Post/telecom 2.19 * (0.34) 
Age 57 − 4.29 * (0.61)  Agriculture (BPL) 1.24 * (0.35) 
Age 58 − 4.63 * (0.62)  Catering (PHC) 0.01  (0.42) 
Age 59 − 4.08 * (0.62)  Cleaning (BPSG) − 0.98  (0.70) 
Age 60 − 2.85 * (0.60)      
Age 61 − 1.95 * (0.90)  Indiv. charact.    
Age 62 − 2.42 * (1.02)  Single woman − 0.09  (0.28) 
Age 63 and 64 − 2.70 * (1.07)  Single man 0.16  (0.24) 
     Non-single woman − 0.27  (0.20) 
Year dummies     Children − 0.28 * (0.13) 
1990 0.20  (0.50)  High income 0.60 * (0.15) 
1991 − 0.36  (0.49)  Mortgage debt 0.01  (0.03) 
1992 0.50  (0.45)  House value − 0.07 * (0.03) 
1993 0.26  (0.45)      
1994 0.10  (0.45)  Incentive variablesc    
1995 0.22  (0.45)  Incentive to retire 2.28 * (0.29) 
1996 − 0.27  (0.45)  Incentive to wait − 0.08  (0.21) 
1997 0.01  (0.47)      
1998 − 0.31  (0.48)  Heterogeneity    
1999 − 0.07  (0.48)  α 0.46 * (0.05) 
     η − 2.56 * (0.68) 
         
Statistics         
Number of 
observations 
  2937      
Log-likelihood   − 1924.86      
 
a Reference groups: health care (PGGM), 1989, pre-pension scheme, non-single man, no high income. 
b Variables marked with * are significant at the 5% significance level. 
c The dummy variable incentive to retire is defined as being eligible for a flat-rate early retirement benefit, while the dummy variable 
incentive to wait is defined as not yet being eligible for an early retirement benefit. 
Source: Dutch Income Panel (Statistics Netherlands), 1989−2000, own calculations 
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Table 5.2 Estimation results, model specification with peak value 
Variable Estimatea  Std. errorb  Variable Estimatea  Std. errorb 
         
Baseline hazard     Industry sectors    
Age 55 − 3.91 * (0.50)  Gov/Edu (ABP) 0.13  (0.22) 
Age 56 − 3.90 * (0.54)  Post/telecom 1.22 * (0.27) 
Age 57 − 3.40 * (0.55)  Agriculture (BPL) 0.73 * (0.31) 
Age 58 − 3.69 * (0.56)  Catering (PHC) 0.21  (0.36) 
Age 59 − 2.96 * (0.56)  Cleaning (BPSG) − 1.16 * (0.60) 
Age 60 − 1.83 * (0.54)      
Age 61 − 0.19  (0.57)  Indiv. charact.    
Age 62 0.60  (1.20)  Single woman − 0.15  (0.27) 
Age 63 and 64 1.39  (1.29)  Single man 0.03  (0.22) 
     Non-single woman − 0.53 * (0.16) 
Year dummies     Children − 0.17  (0.12) 
1990 0.31  (0.50)  Mortgage debt 0.02  (0.02) 
1991 − 0.24  (0.49)  House value − 0.07 * (0.03) 
1992 0.59  (0.45)      
1993 0.45  (0.45)  Financial variables    
1994 0.25  (0.45)  Pension wealthc 3.27 * (0.76) 
1995 0.35  (0.44)  Peak valued − 5.66 * (1.35) 
1996 − 0.10  (0.45)      
1997 − 0.20  (0.46)  Heterogeneity    
1998 − 0.65  (0.46)  α 0.27 * (0.03) 
1999 − 0.45  (0.46)  η − 4.14 * (1.06) 
         
         
Statistics         
Number of 
observations 
  2937      
Log-likelihood   − 1974.37      
 
a Reference groups: health care (PGGM), 1989, pre-pension scheme, non-single man. 
b Variables marked with * are significant at the 5% significance level. 
c Pension wealth is the discounted value of future pension benefits (subsection 2.2). We assume an individual discount rate of 4%. 
d Peak value is the difference between total discounted pension wealth at its maximum expected value and its value if retirement occurs 
immediately (equation (2.7)). 
Source: Dutch Income Panel (Statistics Netherlands), 1989−2000, own calculations. 
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Table 5.3 Estimation results, model specification with option value 
Variable Estimatea  Std. errorb  Variable Estimatea  Std. errorb 
         
Baseline hazard     Industry sectors    
Age 55 − 3.77 * (0.54)  Gov/Edu (ABP) 0.23  (0.22) 
Age 56 − 3.84 * (0.58)  Post/telecom 1.34 * (0.27) 
Age 57 − 3.44 * (0.57)  Agriculture (BPL) 0.76  (0.31) 
Age 58 − 3.81 * (0.58)  Catering (PHC) 0.23 * (0.37) 
Age 59 − 3.14 * (0.56)  Cleaning (BPSG) − 1.06 * (0.61) 
Age 60 − 2.04 * (0.54)      
Age 61 − 0.37  (0.57)  Indiv. charact.    
Age 62 0.31  (1.09)  Single woman − 0.09  (0.27) 
Age 63 and 64 1.04  (1.16)  Single man 0.01  (0.22) 
     Non-single woman − 0.46 * (0.16) 
Year dummies     Children − 0.18  (0.12) 
1990 0.32  (0.51)  Mortgage debt 0.02  (0.02) 
1991 − 0.19  (0.50)  House value − 0.07 * (0.03) 
1992 0.63  (0.46)      
1993 0.49  (0.46)  Financial variables    
1994 0.28  (0.45)  Pension wealthc 3.96 * (0.75) 
1995 0.37  (0.45)  Option valued − 0.35 * (0.09) 
1996 − 0.08  (0.45)      
1997 − 0.18  (0.47)  Heterogeneity    
1998 − 0.63  (0.47)  α 0.27 * (0.03) 
1999 − 0.43  (0.47)  η − 3.95 * (0.90) 
         
         
Statistics         
Number of 
observations 
  2937      
Log-likelihood   − 1975.79      
 
a Reference groups: health care (PGGM), 1989, pre-pension scheme, non-single man. 
b Variables marked with * are significant at the 5% significance level. 
c Pension wealth is the discounted value of future pension benefits (subsection 2.2). We assume an individual discount rate of 4%. 
d Option value is the difference between utility from delayed optimal retirement and immediate retirement (equation (2.5)). We assume  
k = 1.7 and γ = 0.75 (equation 2.6). 
Source: Dutch Income Panel (Statistics Netherlands), 1989−2000, own calculations 
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Table 6.1 Observed and predicted conditional early retirement probabilities (hazard rates) by age, in %a,b 
 Retirement age           
 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63  GF1c GF2c 
            
Government (ABP)           
# obs. 1232 937 709 532 366 253 139 55 20    
hazard 5.0 2.9 5.1 3.6 10.1 22.5 46.0 16.4 5.0    
M_IV 2.9 2.9 4.7 3.4 8.9 25.4 47.7 18.9 14.2  0.984 0.983 
M_PV 2.7 2.8 4.4 3.4 8.5 24.2 51.3 18.3 13.0  0.982 0.977 
M_OV 2.7 2.8 4.4 3.5 8.6 24.1 51.1 18.4 13.2  0.982 0.978 
             
Education (ABP)           
# obs. 741 592 462 372 284 189 123 34 18    
hazard 1.2 2.2 2.6 3.0 5.3 7.4 56.1 17.6 16.7    
M_IV 2.7 2.8 4.5 3.2 5.6 16.4 52.6 15.6 11.6  0.978 0.964 
M_PV 2.7 2.7 4.4 3.5 7.3 19.2 54.2 19.3 10.5  0.973 0.956 
M_OV 2.5 2.6 4.2 3.4 7.3 19.8 54.1 19.1 10.6  0.972 0.954 
             
Health care (PGGM)          
# obs. 445 335 258 178 116 68 17 7 4    
hazard 0.7 0.0 0.8 1.1 0.9 58.8 23.5 28.6 0.0    
M_IV 0.8 0.9 1.5 2.9 4.3 31.7 37.2 13.6 6.8  0.963 0.879 
M_PV 1.6 1.7 2.6 2.3 4.3 24.3 53.4 23.3 10.9  0.951 0.837 
M_OV 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.3 4.6 23.3 53.2 23.8 10.9  0.950 0.835 
             
Post/telecom (TPG/KPN)         
# obs. 224 175 122 83 57 33 17 3 0    
hazard 4.5 14.3 9.8 8.4 15.8 24.2 76.5 33.3     
M_IV 8.8 8.2 12.1 8.2 11.3 22.3 68.3 52.8   0.981 0.879 
M_PV 7.3 6.8 10.3 7.7 13.2 27.1 43.6 12.1   0.973 0.837 
M_OV 7.4 6.9 10.3 7.7 13.4 28.1 42.8 12.9   0.972 0.835 
             
Other industry sectors (BPL/PHC/BPSG)        
# obs. 295 219 165 106 70 37 19 13 7    
hazard 0.7 0.5 9.7 6.6 14.3 32.4 21.1 23.1 14.3    
M_IV 2.0 2.1 3.2 4.3 17.1 32.6 30.9 15.9 14.3  0.983 0.949 
M_PV 2.6 2.6 3.8 4.1 12.4 29.5 41.4 22.4 18.6  0.980 0.923 
M_OV 2.8 2.8 4.0 4.2 11.9 28.3 41.6 22.4 18.2  0.980 0.922 
             
a The conditional early retirement probabilities (hazard rates) observed in the data are according to the Kaplan-Meier method. 
b M_IV is model with indictor variables, M_PV is model with peak value, and M_OV is model with option value. 
c Goodness-of-fit measures, see equation (6.1). As weights, GF1 uses the number of observations while GF2 uses unity. We do not use 
the inverse of the observed hazard rate as weights as for some cells they are equal to zero. For age 64 the number of observation per 
industry sector is very small and we did not include this age in the table. 
Source: Dutch Income Panel, 1989−2000, own calculations 
 
